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Out of the Ashes: Building and Rebuilding the Nation  
 
In 1825, just four years after Venezuela had gained independence from the Spanish 
crown, Simón Bolívar, the “Liberator” of the new republic, sat down to pen a letter to 
his uncle. “Caracas does not exist,” he wrote, “but its ashes, its monuments, the earth 
it occupied, now shine with freedom and are covered in the glory of martyrdom.”1 
Bolívar’s riff on the debris of empire was an attempt to reconfigure a scene that made 
sense: in this urban panorama, gleaming monuments were footholds that illuminated 
the route toward the consolidation of the nation state. In this entanglement of 
architecture and development intimated by Venezuela’s founding father, spatial 
arrangements symbolize prospects of renewal—future horizons where the nation takes 
shape over and above the amorphous rubble left in the wake of struggles and strife.   
 
Bolívar’s gloss on Caracas’ ruinous landscape was but a rhetorical exercise, yet the 
task of making such scenes a tangible reality has overshadowed nation building 
projects ever since, not least because the urban scene he envisaged was no mundane 
skyline: this was a quixotic spectacle in which ruins shone with freedom. This image 
of gleaming debris implied that if this feat of transfiguration was possible during 
emancipation from imperial rule, then the future landscapes of a sovereign Venezuela 
were sure to be even more dazzling and grandiose. These great expectations have 
inflected the governmental agendas, political mythologies, and spatial arrangements 
to such an extent that they have recently been declared the herencia de la tribu—the 
burdensome “inheritance of the tribe” that compels politicians, from post-
independence to the present, to build the bright future that Bolívar pictured.2 Thus, 
bound to found the nation time and again, incoming leaders discard their 
predecessors’ projects, promising new political and spatial orders that will elevate 
Venezuela to its preordained role at the helm of the region.3 
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If Bolívar set the tone to envisage the postcolonial nation in dazzling forms, the 
advent of oil economy provided fuel for quests to render the modern Venezuelan 
landscape into a high-gloss reflection of first world development: a scene in which 
monumental constructions like El Helicoide became flagships of progress. The 
propensity towards periodic reinvention only intensified in the twentieth century as 
Venezuela became an oil nation and soaring revenues. In Venezuela’s “magical 
state,” as Fernando Coronil termed its modern iteration, petroleum booms have driven 
political leaders to abandon existing projects and channel petrodollars into new 
“spectacles of progress” tasked with setting the mold of definitive development.4 The 
contemporary landscape attests to the trials of nation building, which have left in their 
wake not only gleaming monuments, but also bright objects whose lights have been 
turned out.  
 
Venezuela on a Pedestal  
Half a century passed between Bolívar’s description of Caracas’ devastation and the 
first concerted attempts to clear the rubble and build solid foundations for the nation-
state. The independence struggles had caused wideranging devastion, killing more 
than thirty percent of the population, forty six percent of slaves, and leaving only a 
quarter million of four and a half million cattle, which, as historian Elías Pino Iturrieta 
puts it, turned Venezuela after 1830 into an “archipelago:” a profoundly disintegrated 
and disorderly territory, where the lack of roads, bridges, and security turned each 
region into its own isolated island.5 Although “Venezuela was born into a cradle of 
good intentions,” attempts to reorganize national life set in motion in the initial 
decades after independence were stunted by the civil conflict unleashed by the 
Federal War of 1858-1863.6  
 
                                                                                                                                           
Bolívar (1783-1830) in the liberation of five different nations: Colombia (1819), 
Venezuela (1821), Ecuador (1822), Peru (1824), Bolívia (1825). 
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During this protracted conflict, even the debris left by the earthquake of 1812, which 
had destroyed the main colonial buildings, was yet to be cleared. It was only after 
1870 that efforts began to put assemble a picture of stability. The dominance of the 
bougeois class and centralized governance provided the necessary conditions to 
formulate a plan to rebuild the nation, develop infrastructure, and expand capitalist 
production. Under General Antonio Guzmán Blanco, who dominated politics from 
1870-1887, Venezuela began to emerge out of the wreckage of war and internal 
displacement.7 The Illustrious American, as he was known, promised to remake 
Venezuela by developing urban infrastructure, such as railways, theatres, aqueducts, 
abbatoirs; building monumental government buildings; and by reorganizing the army. 
In 1874, this francophile president founded a Ministry of Public Works and promised 
to turn Caracas into a showcase of Haussmann-inspired urban renovation, designating 
fifty percent of all state constructions works commissioned from 1870 to 1888 for the 
capital.8 Decked out with widened avenues, a neo-Gothic university, theaters, and 
public spaces, the restyled city was a marker of modernity for locals and foreigners 
alike. 
 
Public monuments were at once levers of power and seeds to grow nationalist 
sentiment. Guzmán Blanco initiated a paradigm shift in urban space that was devised 
to shake off Spanish heritage, cement the nascent “cult of Bolívar” in honor of the 
independence hero, and bring republican values to sites of public assembly.9 Across 
the land, the Plaza Mayor at the heart of the colonial grid was rechristened as the 
Plaza Bolívar. In the capital, this transformation was marked by a public ceremony on 
October 11, 1874, in which Guzmán Blanco and his entourage gathered to watch as 
two metal boxes were lowered into the cavity of a hefty pedestal that weeks later 
would be topped with a heroic statue of Bolívar cast in bronze (Fig. 1). Like a time-
capsule of a national identity in the making, the pedestal was filled with objects that 
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attested to the solidifying state apparatus, among which were constitutions and laws, 
portraits of Guzmán Blanco, the first national census of 1873, and an atlas of 
Venezuela’s entire territory. This was no simple mount for Bolívar’s effigy: the plinth 
was a monument in itself.10  
 
FIG. 1- PENDING IMAGE OF BOLIVAR'S PEDESTAL FROM AFU 
 
In the ensuing years, public monuments and infrastructure works alike served as 
premises for public festivities, as well as backdrops for Guzmán Blanco to posture as 
chief architect of the nation’s sovereignty and modernization. Amid sparkling 
firecrackers and booming cannon shots that marked the inauguration of the aqueduct 
and urban promenade at El Calvario park in Caracas, the president forecast a 
providential scene: Venezuela would be a land “with a blossoming industry, with our 
rivers that resemble seas and our seas that resemble oceans, with hundreds of 
steamships from the Orinoco river to the River Plate [in Argentina] loaded with 
diverse and rich products from this blessed land.”11 The future was bright indeed. 
 
Forest Fortress 
While not exactly as Guzmán Blanco predicted, at the dawn of the twentieth century 
Venezuela did undergo drastic transformations. Oil prospectors had been exploring 
the hinterlands for some time on the hunch that “black gold” was bubbling away in 
the subsoil. By July 31, 1914, Pozo Zumaque in the western state of Zulia became the 
nation’s maiden oil well. Six years later a torrent of petroleum gushed from the 
ground at Pozo Barroso, baptizing Venezuela in “the devil’s excrement” and 
confirming the potentials for instant wealth. This boon enabled autocrat General Juan 
Vicente Gómez (1908-1935) and his acolytes to benefit from their inside track on oil 
concessions and other enterprises to line their pockets with gold. Gómez presided 
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over Venezuela’s transition from indebted agricultural economy to solvent oil 
exporter with a centralized state, new hydrocarbon legislation, and a monopoly on 
military muscle that prevailed over regional strongmen who might have designs on 
power.12 Surrounded by Positivist ideologues that justified his regime with dubious 
arguments that Venezuelans’ racial mix made them an unruly bunch that needed a 
firm hand, Gómez ruled the nation like a patriarchal hacendado, accumulating a 
personal fortune so vast that he was reputed to be the wealthiest man in South 
America. 
 
A one-time cowboy from the mountainous Táchira state who soon positioned himself 
as an important cattle rancher, Gómez was more at home in the leafy provinces than 
the bustling capital, taking up official residence in the garden city of Maracay and 
thus shifting the spotlight from Caracas.13 Beyond the public infrastructure erected in 
this de facto capital, Gómez set his sights on a pet project that embodied his pursuit of 
personal wealth and far-reaching control. He would build a hideaway deep in the 
cloud forest of the cordillera that separates Maracay from the Caribbean coastal towns 
of Choroní and Chuao. The dictator dreamt of an Alpine-style retreat in which to 
entertain diplomats and dignitaries, socialites and businessmen—a place where 
backhanders and concessions would be brokered out of sight, while a sweeping 
panorama stretching across three states would be right at his feet (Fig. 2). And he got 
what he wanted. In the early 1930s, Gómez commissioned French engineer André 
Potel to design the four-story art deco palace of Rancho Grande, complete with 
tunnels where he could take refuge in case of fractures in the social order.  
  
Rancho Grande is a clear forerunner of the type of forceful earth moving that would 
later characterize El Helicoide, and redolent of the unstable foundations of hubristic 
designs. At the location, set off a winding mule track at the Portachuelo Pass, workers 
began chipping away at the rock face to build this “fortresslike building of concrete 
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and stone” which would sit perched “in a niche carved from the mountainside, 
curving to fit [it] like an inverted question mark.”14 Banked up by ramparts against the 
cliff, Rancho Grande was a dramatic mix of the obscure and the spectacular. Behind 
the scenes, a dark and narrow labyrinth corridor wound its way between the structure 
and the rock face to cell-like rooms. Up front, a grandiose 100-foot veranda spread 
out along the cliff providing view of the landscape. Works advanced apace and the 
building was nearing completion when just before Christmas 1935, the ailing and 
ageing Gómez died.  
 
INSERT FIG 2: RANCHO GRANDE 
Alexander Wetmore, Album 2: Venezuela (Washington: Smithsonian Field Book 
Project, 1952).  
  
With Gómez gone, Rancho Grande’s construction stopped, and the task of building 
democracy took over. Military officers like General Eleazar López Contreras (1937-
1941), who had been a government minister under Gómez, and then Isaías Medina 
Angarita (1941-1945), presided over this transition as newly formed parties 
formulated political agendas for democratic representation and a shift away from 
caudillo rule. After decades of economic corruption, discussions about how to best 
use the nation’s oil revenues came to the fore amid the continual rise of petroleum 
power, which was concentrated in the hands of the Rockefeller family through its 
Standard Oil subsidiary the Creole Petroleum Corporation. Yet, instead of following 
the lead of Mexico, which nationalized oil in 1936, that same year intellectual Arturo 
Uslar Pietri made a now-famous call for to state to sembrar el petróleo: to sow oil 
profits back into traditional industries.  
 
As these debates about reformed economic policy played out, others complained that 
Gómez’s successors were holding back on full democratization. A decade after the 
demise of dictatorship, Rómulo Betancourt (founder of the Acción Democrática party, 
AD), pacted with a military clique led by General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, to form a 
civic-military alliance that seized power on October 18, 1945. Still, the democratic 
interlude that led to Venezuela’s first universal elections in 1946, which brought 
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novelist and AD politician Rómulo Gallegos to power, was shortlived. Frustrated that 
national development remained sluggish, on November 24, 1948, a Military Junta 
took politics back into its own hands, placing democracy on the backburner once 
again.  
 
Above the Clouds 
Although the Junta promised free elections in December 1952, this prospect 
disappeared when a fraudulent vote count instated defence minister and coup-leader 
Pérez Jiménez in power. Over a decade of initially soft then increasingly harsh 
military rule, the regime curbed party politics, imposed censorship, and curtailed trade 
unionism, offsetting these social costs with an ambitious public works programs 
bankrolled by the oil boom caused by the closure of the Suez Canal and the Iranian 
crisis of 1954. Rising state revenues and the influx of foreign—mainly US—
investment created a favorable economic setting, giving the regime an open 
checkbook to materialize promises laid out in its New National Ideal. This ruling 
ideology, condensed into a few lines, pledged a return to the core values of military-
led independence, Venezuela’s refoundation as an “ever more prosperous, dignified, 
and strong” country, and spatial transformations as guarantors of development. 
Democracy was a nothing but a lot of hot air, the new leaders claimed. It was deeds 
not words that mattered. 
 
By consequence, modern architecture and infrastructure took center stage as markers 
of national progress and military efficiency.15 If Bolívar depicted post-independence 
debris as the foundations of sovereignty, for Pérez Jiménez demolitions and earth 
moving were tangible proof of modernity. The dictatorship elevated bulldozers to the 
status of national insignia, combining military metaphor and technocratic dogma to 
launch a housing project dubbed the Batalla contra el rancho. In this “battle” against 
the makeshift homes that were spreading across the hills of Caracas, machines would 
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destroy provisional dwellings and replace them with modernist high-rise blocks, 
devised to house the city’s growing population.16  
 
The forward-looking aesthetics of mid-century modernism offered an expedient 
resource for Pérez Jiménez in his bid to outshine the advances made under 
democracy. Although skeptics grumbled that the capital had become a delusive 
“prism of appearances,” comprised of a pastiche of “little pieces of Los Angeles, San 
Pablo, Casablanca, Johannesburg, Jakarta [... and h]ouses in the style of Le Corbusier, 
Niemeyer, and Gio Ponti,” official propaganda was there to entrench the message that 
Caracas’s makeover was proof of the nation’s unstoppable progress.17 As a 
“storefront” of modernism, Caracas was the centerpiece of a nation branding 
campaign that presented the military rulers as architects of Venezuela’s 
transformation, even though in truth many flagship projects were birthed during the 
democratic interlude after Gómez. Such was the case of Carlos Raúl Villanueva’s 
celebrated University City, birthed by democracy but inaugurated under dictatorship 
in 1954 to provide a stunning backdrop for the X Inter-American Conference, where 
Pérez Jiménez showcased his leadership and anti-communist credentials. Other 
buildings fulfilled similarly promotional functions, not least architect Cipriano 
Domínguez’s Corbusian-inspired Centro Simón Bolívar, designed in 1948 and 
inaugurated in 1954. Promoted internationally as Venezuela’s answer to the 
Rockefeller Center, the government and commercial complex shone a light on the 
nation as an emergent global player and fertile terrain for capitalist enterprise.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Tomás Sanabria’s Hotel Humboldt. SOURCE INFO 
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If verticality was a marker of modernity, as twentieth century skyscrapers implied, 
then this new oil country was attempting to rise up over the traditional red roofs 
associated with its colonial past. The topography of Caracas lent itself to this 
endeavor and the dictatorship attempted to scale real heights. Like Gómez, Pérez 
Jiménez had his own Alpine-inspired pet project: the construction of a cable car that 
would climb the Ávila Mountain to a fourteen-floor luxury hotel built at over two 
thousand meters above sea level (Fig. 3). Designed by Venezuelan architect Tomás 
Sanabria and landscaped by Brazilian designer Roberto Burle Marx, the Hotel 
Humboldt’s penthouse afforded the dictator his own mountaintop panopticon to 
survey the city on one side and the Caribbean sea on the other. Construction advanced 
at the rapid pace and by 1955 Pérez Jiménez was boarding the gilded presidential 
cabin ready to rise above the clouds.  
 
The project is paradigmatic of the spectacles of progress that characterized military 
rule. Stripped of their democratic rights to elect their leaders, Venezuelans were 
compelled to applaud the rational thrust of engineering, the creative verve of 
architecture, and the dogged efficiency of military leaders. Much as the Roca Tarpeya 
would serve as the support for El Helicoide, the Ávila Mountain became a plinth for 
the monumental Hotel Humboldt: a dazzling centerpiece of modern architecture, 
tasked with symbolizing the conviction that Venezuela was moving onwards and 
upwards. Anything was possible; the future was now.  
 
Glass Curtains 
The boom did not last. The escalating costs of public spending combined with 
mounting public discontent loosened the dictatorship’s grip on power. At the same 
time, structural factors such as greater urbanization and fast-paced industrialization 
that developed alongside the oil economy, paved the way for regime change and the 
“creation of a reformist political space.”18 In 1957, political parties rallied 
Venezuelans to action, the church adopted an increasingly critical stance, and national 
strikes and protests ousted Pérez Jiménez, who fled the nation as dawn broke on 
January 23, 1958. Over the following months, leading figures from Venezuela’s three 
main political parties, Acción Democrática, COPEI, and Unión Republicana 
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Democrática brokered the Punto Fijo Pact, which paved the way for elections by 
setting in place guarantees for democratic representation.  
 
If the fifties was the decade of earth moving, in the sixties it was the tectonic plates of 
politics that were shifting. Although the Punto Fijo Pact cemented a new political 
order that enshrined national unity by establishing a shared agenda that was to go 
beyond party politics, the re-establishment of democracy was rife with tensions. 
Factionalism in the left, guerrilla activities, anti-government protests in the arts, and 
an assassination attempt on president Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964), masterminded 
by Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, a right wing ally of Pérez Jiménez, all 
dominated the national agenda. In this fraught setting, ostentatious buildings like the 
Hotel Humboldt suddenly looked out of place, not least since the visit that Fidel 
Castro paid the cable car on the heels of the triumphant Cuban Revolution marked sea 
changes in the region’s political barometer. Marking a turn to austerity, Betancourt 
abandoned the dictatorship’s most pharaonic plans, scaling back designs for a new 
exhibition and government complex planned to host a world fair-inspired 
International Exposition in 1960.19 Instead, the same site in Caracas’s eastern reaches 
took on a more modest scale, inaugurated by Betancourt in 1961 as the Parque del 
Este, a park landscaped by Burle Marx and associates, which replaced dictatorial 
hubris with public amenities.  
 
While the following years saw a two-party system take shape, as Acción Democrática 
and COPEI, the Christian Democratic Party, took turns in power, by the next decade 
events in the global economy proved a gamechanger in Venezuela once again. Amid 
the oil crisis of 1973 prices for crude petroleum increased four-fold, sucking up 
“money as if by a frenzied tornado from the center nations of the first world to the oil-
exporting countries of the periphery,” including OPEC founding member 
Venezuela.20 As he came to power in 1974, Carlos Andrés Pérez cashed in on this 
bonanza, declaring a second independence and the nation’s rebirth as the Gran 
Venezuela. This vision rekindled dreams of instantaneous development, casting the 
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state as the driving force of industrialization achieved by import substitution and the 
nationalization of oil and steel.  
 
FIGURE 4 
Parque Central. SOURCE INFO 
 
As public spending soared, privately funded buildings shot up alongside it, with high-
yield ventures in real estate, commerce and construction, generating instant wealth for 
investors. Conveniently for Pérez, in 1970 the state’s urban planning body, the Centro 
Simón Bolívar, had already begun construction work on the Parque Central complex, 
comprised of a pair of 59-storey skyscrapers, residential towers, complete with 
cultural and commercial facilities and a heliport to boot (Fig. 4).21 Located off the 
Avenida Bolívar, at the foot of the San Agustín del Sur neighborhood on whose hills 
El Helicoide had been built, Parque Central furthered Venezuela’s rebranding as an 
economic and cultural powerhouse. Its iconic towers, long the tallest in Latin 
America, shaped up to the country’s nickname of Saudi Venezuela. While tenants 
ascended the forty-four-floor residential blocks, government employees whooshed up 
two main glass-covered towers to offices that rewarded them with sweeping vistas of 
the city. At street level, a brand-new Museum of Contemporary Art boasted a world-
class collection of works by international masters and local luminaries, located just a 
stone’s throw from the brutalist Teatro Teresa Carreño arts complex whose 
construction began in 1973. 
 
In the early 1980s, Parque Central’s newly-inaugurated towers continued to glimmer 
in the Caribbean sun, but the economy lost its shine. The books were no longer 
balancing: foreign debt rose, oil plunged, and on February 18, 1983 Venezuela had its 
own “Black Friday” when the bolivar suffered an unprecedented devaluation against 
the dollar. Despite the crisis, the memory of instant wealth enjoyed by local investors 
in the previous boom years lingered on. Debt repayment took precedence over state-
led development, but still private banks displayed signs that a turnaround could be 
imminent, tapping the metropolitan imaginary of global finance as they comissioned 
new skyscrapers. One nearby building project was even set to rival the Parque Central 
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towers: the Centro Financiero Confinanzas—a banking complex spearheaded by 
banker David Brillembourg and designed by Enrique Gómez and Associates, which 
would comprise a forty-five-storey tower and four additional buildings, complete wtih 
30,000m2 office space, a luxury hotel, apartments, a twelve-storey car park, 
swimming pool, and helipad (Fig. 5).22  
 
FIGURE 5 
David Brillembroug poses with a model of the Centro Confinanzas. Ricard2, 1989. 
 
La Torre de David (David’s Tower, as it was dubbed and still known today) not only 
emulated the corporate luxury and iconic contours of the World Trade Center, its 
glass curtain was to be manufactured by the same firm that had clad the ill-fated Twin 
Towers with its specular surface. To be sure, La Torre de David was built on an act of 
faith. Despite the economic crisis six years earlier, when construction began in 1989 
the banking group’s slogan resounded with optimism. Confinanzas, renace la 
confianza, it promised, using a word play to suggest that with (speculative) finance, 
confidence is reborn. Given Brillembourg’s conviction that the economy would rise 
again from the ashes, his tower was set to be a phoenix of sorts. The high gloss glass 
curtain evoked an aspirational scene of first world development, in which 
Venezuela’s buoyant economy was steered by speculative finance and awash in flows 
of transnational capital.  
 
Venezuelans remained invested in a similarly auspicious future, and in 1989 elected 
Carlos Andrés Pérez to a second term in office, banking on a renewal of the Great 
Venezuela he had promised amid the oil boom of the previous decade. However, 
instead of the economic revival, the Grand Turnaround (gran virage) that Pérez 
pledged materialized as a package of neoliberal austerity policies: a shock policy 
drafted to reassure foreign creditors against the threat of default. As state subsidies 
and price controls disappeared, and interest rates were cut loose, violent protests and 
looting erupted in the Caracazo of February 27, 1989.23 Not only had the rebirth of 
investor confidence that Brillembourg predicted been crushed, political disconent 
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intensified. In 1992, military officers, led by Hugo Chávez, made two unsuccessful 
attempts to topple Pérez from power, and by the next year both the president and the 
banker met their demise: Pérez was imprisoned on embezzlement charges and 
Brillembourg died from cancer. As the Confinanzas group caved, construction on its 
new headquarters stopped and La Torre de David began its journey to abandonment 
and ruin, later to be occupied by vulnerable communities and dubbed pejoratively as a 
“slumscraper.”24 
 
Diamonds and Pearls 
Continued economic strife and a further austerity package introduced in 1996 created 
a fertile ground for the ascendency of Hugo Chávez and his Fifth Republic Movement 
(MVR), the basis for the subsequent United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).25 A 
lieutenant from a humble family on the Venezuelan plains, Chávez became inspired 
by leftist guerrillas still at large in the country and founded a political cell with fellow 
officers in 1982. The Movimiento Bolivariano-200, which marked the second 
centenary since Bolívar’s birth in 1783, was the basis for the failed coup of February 
4, 1992, during which Chávez had appeared on television, telling his fellow 
insurgents that he had failed to secure control of the strategic targets in Caracas por 
ahora—for now. The short speech made this underground insurgent into a television 
star.26 
 
Amid growing support, the coup leader was freed from jail in 1994. As he 
campaigned to be elected to office four years later, he offered a departure from the 
political model of the past, arguing that the two-party system forged after 1958 had 
expired and that Venezuela needed a new republic founded on social welfare, 
economic reform, and citizen power. Chávez received a majority backing for a 
revised constitution ratified by popular referendum in 1999. Support soon waned, 
however, especially as the president shifted the political compass toward his mentor 
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Fidel Castro. National strikes, a failed oppposition-led coup in 2002, and an 
unsuccessful recall referendum in 2004, all fanned the fires of deepening political 
polarization. For some, the “Twenty-First Century Socialism” he began to advocate 
after 2005 was the solution to longstanding economic disparities; for others, it was a 
flashback to failed models that was turning back the clock on progress.27   
 
Even with oil at $100 a barrel in the 2000s, Chávez turned his back on the 
metropolitan skyscrapers that had enthused his predecessors. Instead, symbolic capital 
for his imaginary of national renewal came from none other than Simón Bolívar. The 
country’s official name was changed to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and 
Chávez cast his political movement as the Bolivarian Revolution. Shining new lights 
onto the independence struggles and asserting himself as the true heir to Bolívar’s 
legacy, the socialist president updated the Liberator’s musings of 1825. Venezuela 
was in tatters again but he would rebuild the nation from the ruination wrecked by 
neoliberalism, US imperialism, and local oligarchs.  
 
FIGURE 6 
The new mausoleum under construction. Gabriel Méndez, 2012. 
 
Although famed as an orator, this was not just rhetoric. Chávez took a literal approach 
to restoring the nation’s founding father to his bygone radiance. In 2010, he mandated 
the exhumation of Bolívar’s dusty remains, repatriated from Colombia in 1842, 
commissioning forensically-generated portraits to reveal the “real” face of Bolívar. 
Next came the construction of a new 150-million-dollar mausoleum for the Liberator, 
appended to the original National Pantheon in downtown Caracas (Fig. 6). Clad in 
white tiles, the fifty-four-meter high, 2000m2 mausoleum was likened to a skateboard 
ramp, whose curved roof rose eight meters above its nineteenth century predecessor. 
On the black granite inside, set among colored illumination, Bolívar’s remains were 
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enclosed in a brand-new mahogany coffin: a glittering casket “encrusted with 
diamonds, pearls and golden stars.”28  
 
Nearly two hundred years on, Bolívar’s evocation of monuments gleaming with 
freedom emerged like a phoenix out of the ashes once again. Reigniting the fires of 
patriotism, Chávez updated his forebear’s trope to claim the nation had been reborn, 
emancipated this time by socialist revolution. With the eternal flame burning at the 
new Mausoleum’s summit, and the diamond and pearl encrusted sarcophagus, 
Venezuela had gained a shining new monument, and Bolívar’s bones were polished 
off in the process. But as fate would have it, Chávez did not live to see the flame 
ignited, passing away on March 15, 2013, in a battle lost to cancer. In the turmoil that 
has intensified since his death, the mausoleum has paled into the background, 
overshadowed by increasing political strife brought by the rule of his sucessor Nicolás 
Maduro (2013-). In the face of violent protests, record homicide rates, hyperinflation, 
plummeting oil prices, and the scarcity of basic goods and medicines, discussions 
about the shape the nation should take are less concerned with ambitious architecture 
and shining monuments, and more preoccupied with day-to-day necessities.  
 
** 
Although distinct in their historical and political origins, the towering structures and 
curtailed monuments discussed here have one thing in common. Together, they prove 
that the paradigm of nation building through dazzling architecture has both enduring 
traction and unstable foundations. For Bolívar, as for politicians over the next two 
hundred year, spatial arrangements should illuminate the path to future glory; but 
these great expectations are notoriously hard to satisfy. Not only do titanic 
constructions pose practical challenges in themselves; enduring ideological conflicts 
and economic turmoil make for a complex terrain on which to build monumental 
architecture, thus making it especially vulnerable to curtailment and abandonment. 
 
This predicament might explain why Venezuelan playwright José Ignacio Cabrujas 
called nation building a “collective delirum:” a recurring spectacle based on the 
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conviction that the destruction of provisional forms will allow definitive ones to 
emerge in their place.29 By recurrently glossing over ruins to declare Venezuela 
reborn, this mode of nation building is grounded in a propensity to active amnesia, a 
process of forgetting stranded monuments and the lessons they might offer, in order to 
fixate on the next auspicious future molded in new, and purportedly definitive, forms. 
Charting the geneses and afterlives of symbolic sites like El Helicoide offers one 
means to counteract this will to oblivion, recomposing a picture of Venezuela’s 
making that shines a light on its past conflicts, as well as present faultines. In the 
shadows cast by gleaming monuments, the debris that lies at the intersection of nation 
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